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Abstract: 
Ecological Fiscal Transfers (EFT) have recently gained attention as a promising instrument to provide incentives 
for nature conservation addressing public authorities. In parallel, both the EU and different European countries 
are exploring new mechanisms to mobilise funding to support biodiversity conservation. So far, existing EFT 
mechanisms in Europe have been implemented at the national level in Portugal and, to some extent, in France 
while in Brazil EFT schemes exist between the state and local level. In this paper we develop a proposal for an 
EFT design within the supranational context of the EU and assess its potential effects with evidence-based 
estimates. To provide such a knowledge base for a potential supranational EU-EFT implementation, we i) 
provide a theoretical underpinning, and an analytical synthesis of the current experiences both with the uptake of 
EFT and the implementation of EU’s nature conservation legislation (i.e. the Habitats and Bird Directives), ii) 
propose a model for an EFT implementation within the existing EU funding framework for N2k financing which 
is built upon both quantitative and qualitative conservation indicators, iii) compute fiscal effects of our suggested 
model and analyse how the resulting payments would be (spatially) distributed among European regions, and iv) 
discuss the model outcomes in terms of ecological effectiveness, distributive effects, and cost-efficiency. 
Thereby we aim at stimulating a debate about how to better integrate ecological public functions within multi-
level and supra-national governance structures.  
 
 
Keywords: Ecological Fiscal Transfers, European Union, Natura 2000 network, policy advice, spatial 
econometrics  
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Highlights: 
• a tailored proposal for upscaling ecological fiscal transfers to EU level 
• empirical estimations of socio-economic and bio-geographical characteristics of beneficiaries 
• evidence-based policy advice to improve effectiveness of conservation 
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1 Introduction – the need for innovation in conservation policies 
While the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) and The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB) reports (2010) have successfully raised awareness about the importance 
of healthy ecosystems for human well-being, political measures have not yet been sufficient 
to halt the decline in biodiversity (Hooper et al., 2012; Waldron et al., 2013). Being at the 
international forefront in conservation efforts, the EU biodiversity strategy has indeed set 
ambitious goals for conservation but did not yet produce significant progress (European 
Commission, 2015, 2011). The European Natura 2000 (N2k) network of protected areas (PA) 
is a cornerstone of the strategy since transnational habitat and species conservation networks 
play a crucial role in the protection of important natural heritage (Pereira and Navarro, 2015) 
and migratory species (Opermanis et al., 2012). However, while N2k provide substantial 
benefits to both biodiversity and people (ten Brink et al., 2013), the successful 
implementation yet lacks sufficient financing (Kettunen et al., 2016, 2011; Milieu et al., 2016; 
N2k Group, 2016).  
In this context, there is an increasing interest in the supplementary use of economic 
instruments to both increase the financing for biodiversity conservation and improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of conservation (TEEB, 2010). Nonetheless, conservation policy 
and its implementation is primarily a public function (Ring, 2002) and thus remains under the 
public authority. Hence, beyond instruments that address private land users (Vatn, 2015) the 
conservation policy mix is not complete without instruments that support public bodies in 
their function to conserve nature (cf. Ring and Barton, 2014).  
An innovative instrument that addresses public bodies explicitly is Ecological Fiscal 
Transfers (EFT). EFT are a portion of intergovernmental fiscal transfers that allocate tax 
revenue among different government levels according to ecological criteria such as the 
existence of protected areas (PA). EFT are promising in terms of conservation since i) they do 
not necessarily require additional funding as such but can be based on introducing changes to 
existing allocation schemes, and ii) they can be used to incentivise the creation of PAs (Droste 
et al., 2016, 2015; Grieg-Gran, 2000; May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a; Santos et al., 2012). 
Originating from the Brazilian state of Paraná the instrument has spread among other 
Brazilian states (Droste et al., 2015; Grieg-Gran, 2000; Loureiro, 2002; Loureiro et al., 2008; 
May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a; Sauquet et al., 2014). As the first EU Member State, Portugal 
has introduced a fully fleshed EFT scheme from the national to the local governmental level 
for all PA categories in 2007 (Santos et al., 2015, 2012)1. The idea of EFT has received 
international attention (May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008a) and it is gaining momentum regarding 
potential implementations in other states such as Switzerland (Köllner et al., 2002), India 
(Kumar and Managi, 2009), Indonesia (Irawan et al., 2014; Mumbunan, 2011), Germany 
(Ring, 2008b; Schröter-Schlaack et al., 2014) and France (Borie et al., 2014). Even an 
adaptation to the global level has been proposed (Farley et al., 2010).  
Given the lack of finance for a successful implementation of the EU biodiversity 
conservation objectives, including the N2k network, and the potential of EFT to support 
conservation policies through financial incentives for conservation, the aim of this article is to 
explore a possible policy design for a potential EU wide implementation of an EFT scheme 
                                                 
1 Since 2006, a small-scale EFT scheme exists in France which provides ecological transfers for municipalities in 
core zones of national parks or natural marine parks (Borie et al., 2014). 
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based on empirical evidence of the distribution of N2k areas and experiences with existing 
EFT mechanisms. In order to provide the relevant background information, i) we introduce a 
theoretical foundation for an EU level EFT scheme, and synthesise experiences with ii) EFT, 
i.e. in Brazil and Portugal, iii) the N2k network creation, i.e. regarding competencies of 
different government levels, and iii) the current conservation financing within EU funds 
(section 2). We then present a tailored proposal for a European EFT scheme (section 3). In a 
next step, we analyse the spatial distribution of simulated EFT payment flows among 
European regions within the proposed scheme, to display who would benefit from the 
implementation of an EU-EFT scheme (section 4). Finally, we discuss the potential outcomes 
of the proposed scheme in terms of conservation effectiveness, distributional effect, and cost-
efficiency (section 5) and conclude with a note on the political economy of conservation 
(section 6).  
2 Background – what have we learnt so far? 
In order to understand potential design options, we provide a brief theoretical underpinning 
for fiscal transfers in general and introducing an EU-level EFT scheme in particular (section 
2.1). We present the basic functioning of existing national and state-level schemes to local 
governments in Brazil and Portugal, where EFT were first implemented, that serve as an 
empirical basis to condense functional elements of EFT schemes for upscaling to the EU level 
(section 2.2). For a suitable adaptation to the multi-level conservation governance structure of 
the EU, we elaborate on the implementation of N2k policies (section 2.3) and its existing 
funding opportunities within the current EU (co-)financing schemes (section 2.4). This way 
we provide some insights to the institutional framework in which a potential EU-EFT scheme 
might be implemented. 
2.1 A theoretical foundation of an EU-level EFT mechanism 
Considering a multi-level government structure, the various levels each have their particular 
public functions. To fulfil these functions public budgets are required. This is the main reason 
for revenue sharing and fiscal transfer schemes: to ensure sufficient finances for public 
functions at all government levels. Furthermore, there are often equity and efficiency 
considerations that determine the design of the fiscal system (Boadway and Shah, 2009). As a 
general guideline, the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 1969) states that those 
jurisdictions who obtain the benefits of a policy should also bear the costs of providing it. 
There are different forms of fiscal transfers (Boadway and Shah, 2009): General-
purpose transfers supply sufficient funds for general public functions at the local or regional 
level. Specific-purpose transfers are designed to create incentives for lower-level government 
to provide specific public goods and services and are thus earmarked for particular spending 
objectives. The latter may be provided as matching grants that require co-financing from both 
higher and lower level government sources. A third and hybrid form are output-based or 
performance-oriented transfers which are conditioned on the supply of a particular result but 
do not necessarily require that received transfers are spent of specified purposes.  
In the context of ecological public functions (Ring, 2002), these design options have 
different implications for financing conservation policies. General-purpose transfers increase 
the general budget and, depending on how the receiving administration allocates the 
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respective budget, may also increase conservation spending. Specific-purpose transfers are 
earmarked to support the implementation of a certain policy area or activity and can therefore 
be used to internalise spill-over benefits between jurisdictions, i.e. where a local policy 
benefits other local jurisdictions or serves higher level government interests. By lowering the 
cost of provision for decentral governments they create an incentive for an additional supply 
from lower government levels. In the case of PA, some benefits remain at local or regional 
level (e.g. amenity services and local water quality) others spill over to the (inter-)national 
level (e.g. climate regulation and biodiversity conservation) (Gantioler et al., 2010; ten Brink 
et al., 2013) – which constitutes a reason for an internalization. Performance-oriented 
transfers do not necessarily require that the obtained revenue is spent on a particular activity 
but requires the supply of a specific result and thus maintains some decentral autonomy for 
how the money is best spent and how the result is obtained. Through performance-based 
transfers for outputs provision becomes a source of income and thus a greater supply is 
incentivised. Existing EFT schemes are conditional to ecological indicators such as the 
(relative) coverage of PA and hence, while based on the logic of general-purpose transfers 
(i.e. transfers are not earmarked to be used for conservation actions), they are linked to the 
existence of protected area networks (see section 2.2 for more details). Hence, in the context 
of fiscal terminology EFT can be considered performance oriented. 
In the context of the EU multi-level conservation governance structure there are thus 
different arguments for different possible types of fiscal transfers or fund mechanism designs. 
From the perspective of EU level interests, general-purpose transfers may not well serve the 
purpose implementing conservation policies since they miss a close tie to conservation 
spending or outputs. Specific-purpose transfers that are dedicated to particular programmes 
and activities are already in place (see section 2.4 for more detail) and serve two main 
purposes: they can ensure that spending relates to conservation policies and they could ensure 
that sufficient funding is available for conservation activities in order to fulfil higher level 
government interests. Of the two only the first is given, since a N2k funding gap remains and 
sufficient funding is not ensured (Kettunen et al., 2016, 2011; Milieu et al., 2016; N2k Group, 
2016). Performance-oriented transfers, such as EFT, have not yet been implemented in a 
supra-national governance system.  
Summarising the theoretical foundation for a EU-EFT scheme, we argue that  
i) positive spill-over benefits from N2k and the realization of EU level interests at 
decentral levels call for an internalization via fiscal transfers, and 
ii) a performance-oriented design would facilitate some decentral spending and 
implementation autonomy which allows for a greater degree of freedom in 
realization decentral level interests.  
2.2 Current EFT experiences 
The very first EFT scheme was developed in the Brazilian state of Paraná in 1991 where a 
large share of local tax revenue comes from the generation of value-added taxes (Loureiro, 
2002). Before 1991 those municipalities that hosted a large portion of state or federal PA were 
disadvantaged in terms of foregone income through land-use use restrictions imposed by 
conservation areas and watershed protection. They had thus difficulties to obtain sufficient 
funds to cover the expenditure of their public functions and required compensation (Grieg-
Gran, 2000). An alliance of municipal actors and the state’s legislative assembly teamed up 
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for the creation of a fiscal transfers scheme that included ecological indicators alongside 
socio-economic indicators (Loureiro, 2002). As a result, municipalities that host PAs now 
receive a share of tax revenue (in the Brazilian case a portion of the value-added tax). While 
the original idea of the Brazilian EFT was to compensate municipalities for foregone tax 
revenue, the scheme evolved and transformed into being perceived as an incentive mechanism 
for conservation (Loureiro, 2002). The novel instrument also spread among other Brazilian 
states such that currently 17 out of 26 states introduced EFT in their intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer law (Droste et al., 2015).  
In EFT schemes, as currently in place in Brazil and Portugal2, municipalities that host 
PA receive EFT that have no specific spending purposes attached. As these transfers are 
linked to the existence of PA, we interpret them as output-based or performance-oriented 
transfers.  
Formalising the Brazilian scheme, an environmental index 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖is calculated (equation 1), 
that consists of the municipal conservation factor 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖, given by the ratio of municipality 𝑖𝑖’s 
protected areas (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) and its total municipal area (𝑀𝑀) (equation 2), over the state conservation 
factor 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹, defined by the sum of sum of all 𝑛𝑛 municipalities 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹s (equation 3). Finally, the 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is included as a factor in the allocation mechanism of particular tax revenues
3 and its 
distribution to local governments. 
 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  (1) 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 = �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (3) 
 
In the calculation of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖, different PA categories are weighted according to their 
contribution to conservation goals, ranging from low weights for less land-use restrictive PA 
and heavier weights for stricter PA (Grieg-Gran, 2000; Loureiro, 2002; Ring, 2008a). Based 
on this original design further EFT reforms have been introduced in Paraná, which led to the 
inclusion of additional criteria on the quality of the PA (Loureiro et al., 2008). This takes into 
account a second quality criterion beyond the PA category weight 𝑤𝑤, the variation in the 
quality of the PA or ∆𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (Loureiro et al., 2008). This criterion changes the calculation of 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 by adding a weight according to the change in quality of all 𝑚𝑚 PA into formula for 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
of municipality 𝑖𝑖 (equation 4). The respective quality changes are assessed yearly (Loureiro et 
                                                 
2 While the Brazilian schemes mainly use the share of protected areas on total municipal area in per cent, the 
Portuguese system uses both the total area under protection in the municipality in hectare and the share of 
municipal territory occupied by PA. Each municipality receives a certain amount for every hectare of PA within 
its boundaries, but municipalities with over 70 per cent of PA coverage receive a higher amount per hectare PA 
(for a detailed description of the Portuguese EFT system, see Santos et al., 2015, 2012). As the Brazilian scheme 
has the advantage to take account of the relative land-use restrictions imposed by PA irrespective of the 
jurisdictions’ size, we build our EU-level approach on the Brazilian scheme. 
3 In Brazil it is a percentage of about up to 5 per cent of the state-level value-added tax. In Portugal, about 5 to 
10 per cent of the General Municipal Fund is allocated according to PA location and coverage.  
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al., 2008). In Portugal neither the different categories, nor the quality of PA are taken into 
account (Santos et al., 2012). 
 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 =  �𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=1
(1 + ∆𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗)  (4) 
 
Regarding the effects of EFT, the first econometric policy evaluation studies have been 
conducted for panel data of the state of Paraná (Sauquet et al., 2014), all Brazilian states 
(Droste et al., 2015), and Portugal (Droste et al., 2016). These studies conclude, that after 
introducing an EFT scheme, municipalities respond to the monetary, fiscal incentive inherent 
in designating a share of tax revenue to ecological indicators such as PA share by the creation 
of additional municipal protected areas. However, it is important to note that for such a 
response to the incentive the existence of respective municipal competencies to designate PA 
on their own is a requirement (Droste et al., 2016). This is a crucial element for the design of 
similar schemes: only if the addressed jurisdictions have respective competencies in nature 
conservation policies, the incentive effect may actually result in enhanced conservation efforts 
(see section 2.3 for competencies regarding N2k areas).  
In summary, the experiences with existing EFT schemes suggest that:  
i) they incentivise a positive attitude towards conservation and improve conservation 
efforts through conditionality on performance for given ecological criteria, while 
ii) a respective EU level adaptation would have to take into account the respective 
conservation competencies of jurisdictions that could receive an EU-EFT scheme, 
e.g. regarding N2k areas, in order to ignite a response. 
 
2.3 N2k network creation, implementation and decentral competencies 
The European N2k network consists of Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) defined by the 
Habitats Directive and the Special Protection Areas (SPA) defined by the Birds Directive 
(Evans, 2012). In total, there are more than 27,000 sites, covering over 18 per cent of EU 
terrestrial territory and important marine areas (EU, 2015). In terms of target achievement, 
mid-term evaluation of the EU biodiversity strategy states that the full implementation of the 
N2k network shows insufficient progress (European Commission, 2015). A recent study 
regarding the effectiveness and fitness of the Nature Directives found that they are effective 
“where they are fully and properly implemented [although] … there has been limited progress 
towards improving the status of most European protected species and habitats [and] … 
examples suggest that efficiency could be improved by more cost-effective implementation, 
especially at national and regional level” (Milieu et al., 2016, p. 518). The same study 
concludes that among the top priority areas for improvement are “the availability of public 
funding” and the management (plans) of N2k sites (Milieu et al., 2016, p. 520). In order to 
synthesise experiences with the N2k implementation, i.e. regarding the responsibilities and 
competencies of different government levels, we will therefore, review the designation 
process, and the respective competencies of decentral authorities, before discussing financial 
issues (section 2.4). 
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Designation process: Basically, the N2k network has been designated by Member 
States and / or their respective decentral authorities to protect (migratory) species and 
ecologically important natural habitats and species (Evans, 2012). After an initial proposal of 
sites from Member States an iterative process via conservation seminars on potentially 
missing habitats and species in which EU officials, observers and environmental NGOs 
participated, the N2k area list was continuously determined and specified (Evans, 2012). A 
relatively recent development is the designation of Marine Protected Areas (or MPA) within 
the N2k network (Evans, 2012). While it has been stated that N2k started with a technocratic 
approach it has broadened over time and includes much more (yet not necessarily sufficient) 
stakeholders by now (Ferranti et al., 2013). This is to say the designation includes expertise 
from EU conservation officials but also relies upon suggestions and proposal from Member 
States, their respective decentral levels of government, and from civil society organizations. 
The official designation of N2k sites is, however, within the legal competence of Member 
States or their sub-national governments. 
The role of local and regional authorities: Article 6 of the Habitat Directive and article 
4 of the Birds Directive define that appropriate conservation activities have to be realised and 
deteriorating activities have to be avoided. While the management plans are optional, 
‘necessary’ conservation measures have to be implemented by the Member States in 
conformity with the subsidiarity principle (European Commission, 2014). Thus, generally it is 
the legal obligation of the Member States to provide designated N2k sites and to ensure the 
favourable conservation status of species and habitats under protection (for a detailed 
discussion of the legal meaning of favourable see Epstein et al., 2016). The respective 
planning and management tasks are, however, often delegated to decentral government levels. 
Of 24 Member States who replied to a questionnaire about EU conservation measures, 14 
have explicitly mentioned at least partial decentral management responsibilities for N2k sites 
(European Commission, 2014, Annex II). In about half of the EU states management plans are 
obligatory for all N2k sites, in some only for particular sites. Conservation measures include 
statutory, administrative or contractual measures ranging from specifications of legal 
activities on-site to contracts between authorities and land-owners. Hence, on average, there is 
some sort of delegating conservation responsibilities to decentral levels and those mainly refer 
to conservation measures but not so much to plans. Sometimes the implementation is up to 
NGOs or private land-lords.  
Summarising experiences and evaluations of N2k progress, this means that: 
i) an improvement of the implementation of the Habitats and Birds Directives in 
terms of ecological effectiveness and cost-efficiency is needed both at national 
and regional / local level; 
ii)  (environmental) ministries and decentral government levels, or the two of them 
conjointly, are among the key responsible authorities for the implementation of 
the network and respective improvement mechanisms would have to address 
them.  
2.4 Existing co-financing mechanisms for N2k through EU funds 
The establishment and implementation of the Natura 2000 network is mainly financed by the 
Member States and / or their regional or local authorities although, as per the provision of the 
EU nature legislation, there is also co-funding available from the EU (Kettunen et al., 2014). 
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A body of evidence shows that there is a substantial gap regarding the finances available for 
different conservation activities, including the running cost of N2k managing bodies 
(Kettunen et al., 2016, 2011; Milieu et al., 2016; N2k Group, 2016). This financing gap is of 
crucial importance since a fully operational and effective network of PAs requires a range of 
ongoing management activities such as the restoration of sites. Innovative financing 
instruments, such as payments for ecosystem services, off-set schemes and fiscal incentives 
like EFT, have been suggested as means to help to bridge the gap (Kettunen et al., 2016, 
2014). Nevertheless, there are a range of funds and financial sources already available within 
the EU budget to co-finance the establishment and implementation of N2k in Member States 
(Kettunen et al., 2016, 2014); for an overview see table 1. Both public authorities and private 
land-users can receive EU funding, but their eligibility varies between different funds.  
The main instrument to fund the promotion of the environment within the EU is the 
Programme for Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) which aims at a shift towards a 
resource-efficient, low-carbon and climate-resilient economy, environmental protection and 
nature conservation. About 40 per cent of the LIFE fund is dedicated to the conservation of 
nature and biodiversity4 allocated through applications for project calls (Kettunen et al., 
2014). LIFE action grants are available for a wide variety of conservation projects ranging 
from pilot and demonstration to awareness and dissemination projects. But also the European 
Fund for Regional Development (ERDF) includes of biodiversity protection and restoration, 
and ecosystem services promotion via N2k as rural development objectives. After all, most 
EU funds contribute to N2k policies to some extent due to the cross-cutting, integrative nature 
of EU nature and environment policies (cf. Kettunen et al., 2016; see table 1). Nevertheless, 
regarding the choice for a suitable EU fund in which a potential EU-EFT mechanism could be 
implemented most of funds can be dismissed. The EMFF finances fishery and coastal policies 
and is thus not suited for financing terrestrial N2k. The ESF finances social policies and 
capacity building but no land use change or N2k management. The CF finances equity and 
cohesion policies in only particular parts of the EU which does not fit the N2k purpose of 
protecting important sites and species all over Europe. The EARDF finances conservation 
activities only in relation to agriculture and forestry policies but N2k are not restricted to 
those types of land use. H2020 finances research activities which help but do not suffice for 
N2k implementation. For these reasons, only the LIFE and ERDF funds remain as potential 
options since both have conservation activities such as N2k implementation as their explicit 
goals and cover all regions of the EU and thus finance related activities.  
One option would be to increase LIFE such that sufficient funding is available at the 
implementing government levels. From a public finance perspective, such specific purpose 
transfers (with matching or co-financing conditions) are seen as the most appropriate in order 
to ensure sufficient funding and internalizing spill over benefits of the realization of higher 
government level interests. Thus, for closing the N2k financing gap LIFE is the appropriate 
fund via an augmentation of available co-finances but for performance-oriented funds without 
spending specifications the ERDF is more suitable. While LIFE targeting is entirely in the 
hands of the Commission and offers very little if any autonomy, the ERDF finances Rural 
                                                 
4 Around 75% of the total LIFE funding is allocated to the sub-programme for Environment, of which at least 
55% of the resources dedicated to projects financed by way of action grants shall be allocated to support the 
conservation of nature and biodiversity. 
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Development Plans (RDP) and operational programmes (OP) defined by Member States or 
their sub-national jurisdictions. The ERDF requires that portions of the programmes are spent 
on pre-specified priority areas (depending on economic development stages) but provides 
quite some regional spending autonomy. Since EFT normally allocate public revenue 
according to specific ecological criteria such as PA coverage but without earmarking for 
particular spending purposes the ERDF seems the most appropriate to be enhanced through an 
EFT like scheme. Generally, the idea of integrating measurable conservation performance 
indicators into the distributional mechanism of EU-funds like the ERDF is in line with an 
assessment of the Nature Directives which states that “indicators and targets included in the 
analysed RDPs and OPs are in general insufficient to allow for proper monitoring and 
evaluation of results and outcomes in relation to Natura 2000” (Milieu et al., 2016, p. 488). 
However, for the ERDF there are some preferences for less developed Member States and 
remote, mountainous or sparsely populated regions. Therefore, this option needs assessing 
whether resulting EU-EFT payments would be in line with the preferences for marginalised 
regions.  
Summarising, this means: 
i) financing opportunities for biodiversity exist also at EU level, but both the current 
national and EU schemes are not sufficient to respond to the N2k financing needs  
ii) according to a public finance perspective the targeted LIFE funding is appropriate 
to provide sufficient funding for the realization of EU wide conservation interests 
at decentral levels, and a performance-oriented EU-EFT mechanism could be 
integrated into ERDF which allows for greater decentral spending authority in 
order to complement the current funding structure for N2k through setting further 
incentives while maintaining implementation autonomy.  
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Table 1: Overview of existing EU funds in relation to N2k co-financing. Source: authors’ compilation based on Kettunen et al. (2016, 2014) and respective EU legislation. 
abbreviation full name major objective eligible areas addresses type of N2k related activities funding mechanism 
LIFE European financial 
instrument for the 
environment 
protecting and 
improving the quality 
of the environment and 
halting and reversing 
bio-diversity loss, 
including the support 
of the Natura 2000 
network and tackling 
the degradation of 
ecosystems 
all member states public authorities, 
science and private 
land users 
environment and resource 
efficiency, nature and biodiversity 
and environmental governance; 
climate change mitigation, climate 
change adaptation and climate 
governance, information 
about 40 per cent of 
LIFE resources are 
dedicated to project 
action grants in support 
of nature and 
biodiversity 
conservation 
EARDF European 
Agricultural Fund 
for Rural 
Development 
competitive 
agriculture; sustainable 
natural resource 
management; balanced 
territorial development 
preference for less 
developed Member 
States 
public authorities, 
science and private 
land users 
restoring, preserving and enhancing 
ecosystems related to agriculture 
and forestry 
Conditional on rural 
development 
programmes that 
address four of six 
EARDF priorities with 
at least 30 per cent 
expenditure related to 
the environment 
(climate, forest, 
organic farming and 
N2k) 
ERDF European Fund for 
Regional 
Development 
investment in SME; 
sustainable jobs; 
investment in energy, 
environment, transport, 
ICT social, health, 
research, in- novation, 
business, and 
educational infra- 
structure; networking, 
cooperation and 
exchange of experience 
preference for less 
developed Member 
States and 
marginalised 
regions (remote, 
mountainous or 
sparsely populated 
areas) 
public authorities, 
science and private 
land users 
promoting climate change 
adaptation, risk prevention and 
management, including supporting 
investment for adaptation to climate 
change, including ecosystem-based 
approaches; preserving and 
protecting the environment and 
promoting resource efficiency 
including protecting and restoring 
biodiversity and soil and promoting 
ecosystem services, including 
through Natura 2000, and green 
infrastructure 
ERDF project 
implementation in the 
Member States and 
regions through 
operational 
programmes; support 
available level depends 
on the level of 
economic development 
in terms of per capita 
GDP 
EMFF European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund 
Competitive & 
sustainable fishery; 
implementation of 
All Member States Public authorities, 
science and 
fishermen  
protection and restoration of aquatic 
biodiversity, enhancement of 
ecosystems related to aquaculture, 
Fund allocation 
according Member 
States to fishing 
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fisheries policies; 
balanced territorial 
development 
and promotion of resource-efficient 
aquaculture 
industry size, Member 
State development of 
operational programme 
to be approved by EC 
with joint 
implementation 
ESF European Social 
Fund (ESF); 
sustainable and quality 
employment; labour 
mobility; social 
inclusion; poverty 
reduction; education, 
training and vocational 
training; institutional 
capacity of public 
authorities 
preference for less 
developed and 
member states and 
marginalised 
regions (remote, 
mountainous or 
sparsely populated 
areas) 
 enhancement of institutional 
capacity of public authorities and 
stakeholders and investment in 
institutional capacity and in the 
efficiency of public administrations 
and public services 
ESF project 
implementation in the 
Member States and 
regions through 
operational 
programmes; support 
available level depends 
on the level of 
economic 
development; co-
financing rates vary 
between 50 and 85 per 
cent depending on per 
capita GDP 
CF Cohesion Fund Investment in the 
environment, 
sustainable 
development and 
energy 
Member States with 
a gross national 
income (GNI) 
measured in 
purchasing power 
parities less than 90 
per cent of the 
average GNI EU-27 
public authorities, 
science and private 
land users 
promoting climate change 
adaptation, risk prevention and 
management, including supporting 
investment for adaptation to climate 
change, including ecosystem-based 
approaches; preserving and 
protecting the environment and 
promoting resource efficiency 
including protecting and re- storing 
biodiversity and soil and promoting 
ecosystem services, including 
through Natura 2000, and green 
infrastructure 
support available 
depends on the level of 
economic development 
in terms of per capita 
GDP 
FP7 & H2020 Framework 
Programmes for 
research and 
innovation 
transnational research 
in a range of priority 
areas 
all Member States 
and partly 
associated states 
mainly science and 
SMEs 
Research-related conservation 
activities 
Calls for pre-specified 
research projects 
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3 Integrating ecological fiscal transfers in EU funds – a design proposal how to allocate 
performance-oriented transfers to create conservation incentives 
The design for a European EFT scheme proposed and tested in the context of this article (see 
below) is an adaptation of the original scheme in Paraná, Brazil. The Paraná scheme is the 
most mature EFT mechanism to date, including a continuous improvement of the scheme over 
time (Loureiro, 2002; Loureiro et al., 2008). Furthermore, in addition to the PA coverage the 
scheme also takes into consideration variations in PA quality (see section 2.1). The latter is an 
important element for an adaptation of EFT at the EU level, since the most direct incentive 
effect in any EFT– comes through a financial compensation for conservation efforts. This 
constitutes an efficient mechanism of incentivising behaviour that shall exceed the baseline 
conservation set by EU and national legislation.  
Such an incentive, however, only works for jurisdictions that have authority and 
competency to provide such extra efforts (Droste et al., 2016, 2015; see also section 2.2). On 
average decentral government levels within the EU such as municipalities or districts do not 
have particular competencies in designating PA and thereby cannot influence the quantity of 
N2k sites directly. However, they can often influence the quality of N2k sites due to their 
responsibilities in PA management (see section 2.3). In order to design an EU-EFT scheme 
that creates an incentive for conservation efforts and improves conservation outcomes we 
propose a scheme that is composed by two main parts, one quantitative, and one qualitative 
measurement. Under such scheme, those jurisdictions that can increase the N2k coverage 
through additional designations would be incentivised to do so, while those that have PA 
management competencies only would be incentivised to improve their N2k site management 
quality efforts (see section 5 for a more detailed discussion of potential effects of an EU-EFT 
mechanism). Formally, the allocative rule can be expressed as 𝑖𝑖’s jurisdictions’ 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 portion 
of a 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓 distributed among all 𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑛𝑛 jurisdictions (equation 6)  
 
 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 � 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓 , (6) 
 
where 
 
 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , (7) 
 
the Conservation Factor (𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹) is determined by the sum of the share of Protected Area expanse 
(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) on total area (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) in per cent, and the number of habitats with favourable conservation 
status (𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆) as a per cent share of the total number of reported habitats (ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎) for each 
jurisdiction 𝑖𝑖 (equation 7). For the subsequent analysis we computed a simulated EU-EFT 
mechanism according to the above described allocative criteria (see section 4). 
Taking into account feasibility of such a mechanism, given the data side of it, there is a 
constant monitoring of N2k sites (EU, 2015), and Art. 17 of the Habitat Directive and Art. 12 
of the Birds Directive require regular quality assessments of the respective N2k habitat 
statuses and species developments. While the quality monitoring is currently due every six 
years and has been reported twice, the reporting frequency could be increased once sufficient 
institutional knowledge has been acquired.  
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4 Empirical patterns – who would benefit? 
In order to assess who (i.e. which areas) would be the beneficiaries of a potential EU-EFT 
scheme, we analyse the empirical patterns of the spatial distribution of N2k areas among EU-
27 NUTS 2 regions. NUTS is the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (Nomenclature 
des unités territoriales statistiques) and subdivides Member States hierarchically and 
references the units by a geocode5. The system is used in the EU for statistical and analytical 
purposes but also plays a crucial role in framing EU policies and allocating EU funds, i.e. for 
ERDF, ESF and CF (Eurostat, 2016). For each Member States there are 3 levels of NUTS – 
which means the NUTS structure is closely related to the administrative structure of the 
Member States but they are not necessarily identical. By structuring our analysis according to 
NUTS 2 regions we do not just have readily available statistical data and can estimate socio-
economic characteristics of regions that host PA but we also assess it at a regional level that is 
closely related to the distributive mechanism of EU funds, such as the one identified as the 
most suitable one, the ERDF (see section 2.4 for more detail).  
4.1 Data sources, preparation and software6 
The N2k data was retrieved from the European Environment Agency (2015) as shapefiles for 
the years 2009-2013. From these files the intersection with 2013 NUTS 2 regions (Eurostat, 
2015) has been tabulated with a proprietary GIS software such that percentage of N2k area 
per NUTS 2 region and year was calculated. Data for 2009-2013 on the NUTS 2 regions’ area 
(in km²), GDP per capita (regional gross domestic product in purchasing power standard per 
inhabitant), population density (persons per km²), tourism (nights spent at tourist 
accommodation establishments), and unemployment (unemployment rate in per cent) was 
retrieved from Eurostat (2015). Furthermore, the percentages of the NUTS 2 regions in bio-
geographical regions as delineated by the Habitats Directive were computed7 based on 
European Environment Agency data (2015). A plotted map of these variables and summary 
statistics can be found in the appendix. A dataset for the EU-27 NUTS 2 regions was 
constructed and overseas regions were excluded8. Since there were fractions of missing data 
and this would have led to a large overall loss of information within regressions, missing 
observations were imputed with the Amelia package (Honaker et al., 2011) in the R 
environment (R Development Core Team, 2016)9 specifying lower and upper limits of (0.001 
                                                 
5 The code starts with a two letter code referencing the uppermost level of Member States. Each of the following 
levels is identified by a single numeral (plus a letter in case there are more than 9). NUTS 1 are major economic 
regions such as regions, states, provinces or groups of them. NUTS 2 are basic regions for the application of 
regional policies such as counties or planning, territorial or government regions – depending on the Member 
State. NUTS 3 are small regions for specific diagnoses and may be represented by districts, prefectures or 
counties. Regarding policy regions “eligible for support from cohesion policy have been defined at NUTS 2 
level” (Eurostat, 2016), which therefore provides a suitable data basis for simulating a potential EU-EFT 
mechanism. 
6 The R code for preparation and analysis, and the prepared data can be found at the a personal github repository: 
https://github.com/NilsDroste/EFT-EU/  
7 To eliminate inaccuracies in cropping the polygons we re-classified greater or equal 99 per cent shares as 100, 
and less or equal to 1 per cent as 0. The map of bio-geographical regions can be found in the appendix. 
8 Excluded were EU-27 NUTS 2 regions that are geographically located on other continents: ES70, FRA1, 
FRA3, FRA3, FRA4, FRA5, PT20, and PT30. Furthermore, Croatia (HR03, HR04) has not been integrated since 
they became EU member state in 2013. 
9 The fractions of missing values that were imputed are: N2k (0.032), area (0.012), population density (0.011), 
GDP per capita (0.098), tourism (0.108), unemployment (0.013), and proportion of favourable conservation 
status (0.005). 
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and 1.2 times the maximum observed values) and imposing a linear time trend. Missing 
values were imputed 100 times and these data sets were used to average the imputations. This 
resulted in a single balanced panel data set with n=266 EU-27 NUTS 2 regions, and T=5 
years of observation. The observations for the proportion of habitats in favourable 
conservation status (European Environment Agency, 2015) were only available for the year 
2013 (for the reporting period of 2008-2012). The dataset was thus reduced to a 2013 cross-
section subset with n=266 EU-27 NUTS 2 regions10. The maps (see section 4.3) have been 
produced with a combination of the R packages sp (Pebesma and Bivand, 2005), maptools 
(Bivand and Lewin-Koh, 2015) and rworldmap (South, 2011). Additionally, some functions 
from spdep (Bivand and Piras, 2015) have been employed. For the analysis of the spatial 
distribution of EU-EFT flows on the 2013 subset, a regression tree model was used which was 
supplied by the rpart package (Therneau et al., 2015) and trained through cross-validation 
with the caret package (Kuhn, 2008; Kuhn et al., 2016). Additionally, a random forest model 
was estimated for robustness checks of the regression tree (Liaw and Wiener, 2002). The 
summary table has been produced with stargazer (Hlavac, 2015). 
4.2 Econometric model 
In order to analyse where the EFT would flow and in order to account for interactions and 
non-linearities, we employ a classification and regression tree or so called decision tree model 
(Hastie and Tibshirani, 2009, chap. 9.2). Tree-based methods partition (multidimensional) 
data into clusters, groups or regions. The greedy algorithm, also known as recursive binary 
splitting, proceeds as follows to grow a regression tree (Therneau and Atkinson, 2015). At the 
first internal node the entire data is split into two regions such that the Residual Sum of 
Squares is minimised, which means the variable and cut point with the greatest predictive 
power is chosen. Resulting groups are characterised by statistically significant different 
averages of the dependent variable; say the left-hand branch has a low average and the right-
hand side a high average. The splitting process is repeated for each of the resulting branches 
until no further gain in explanatory power can be obtained through additional splits. The 
terminal nodes or leaves of the tree represent the resulting regions or partitions with different 
average response variable values. For our analysis we use a regression tree with the following 
structure (equation 8). 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  , (8) 
 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 is monetary flow of EFT payments for region that are allocated among 𝑖𝑖, … ,𝑛𝑛 
EU-27 NUTS 2 regions based on the proposed design (see section 3) of an arbitrarily chosen 
fund size of 1 billion €, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the area in km², 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 is persons per km², 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 is the 
GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standard), 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 is the overnight stays in tourist 
accommodation establishments, 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 is the unemployment in per cent, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 is 
vector of variables measuring the share of area in the respective bio-geographical regions 
Alpine (ALP), Atlantic (ATL), Black Sea (BLK), Boreal (BOR), Continental (CON), 
Mediterranean (MED), Pannonian (PAN), and Steppic (STE), and 𝜀𝜀 is the residual error term. 
                                                 
10 Covariates data for 2013 is not complete for all NUTS 2 regions. For the missing ones, there is data for 
previous years – which facilitates an imputation of missing data for 2013 such that we have one complete set of 
observations for the year for which conservation statuses are reported. 
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To avoid overfitting, we pruned the tree with a complexity parameter obtained by a tenfold 
cross validation (Kuhn et al., 2016). Each variable is observed (or imputed, see section 4.1) 
for 𝑛𝑛 = 266 EU-27 NUTS 2 regions for 2013. In order to check for robustness we also 
employed a Random Forest model that repeatedly grows regression trees and thus allows to 
average over the ensemble of multiple trees (Liaw and Wiener, 2002). The corresponding 
variable importance plot can be found in the appendix. At this point it suffices to say that the 
variables included in the presented regression tree are among the most important ones given a 
tenfold cross-validated ensemble of 10,000 trees. 
4.3 Spatial distribution of N2k sites in EU-27 
Figure 1 displays the different components of the proposed EU-EFT design: namely the 
quantitative part (percentage of N2k coverage in NUTS 2 regions), the qualitative part 
(proportion of reported habitats that are in favourable conservation status), and the 
distributional pattern of finances that would be allocated through the proposed mechanism. 
While the N2k coverage is stronger in Southern and Eastern Europe, there are a couple of 
regions with a greater proportion of reported habitats that were assessed with a favourable 
conservation status: northern Sweden, Slovakia, Romania, Southern Germany, Austria, 
Slovenia, Southern France, Italy, and Southern Portugal. The payments that result from the 
proposed EFT design are relatively even in their distribution with low payments in the 
Atlantic region, Poland, and Czechia, and top payments in Cyprus, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, and Malta. A histogram of the payments can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 1: a) Percentage of EU-27 NUTS 2 regions' area covered by N2k sites in 2013; b) proportion of habitats 
in favourable conservation status as by EU-27 Member states reported under Article 17 of the Habitats Directive 
for the 2008-2012 period; c) the distributional pattern of the proposed EU-EFT mechanism for an arbitrary 
quantity of 1 billion. Source: authors’ computation based on European Environment Agency (2015). 
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Figure 2: A regression tree for the proposed EU-EFT mechanism, showing to which regions the EFT would 
flow (final sums are based on an arbitrary 1 billion EFT sum, numbers are given in 1,000 €), each node’s 
decision variable and its partitioning is given in bold, and the variables are: Atlantic (ATL), Alpine (ALP), and 
Mediterranean (MED) bio-geographical regions, overnight stays in tourist accommodation establishments (tour), 
unemployment in per cent (unemp), and GDP per capita (GDPcap). Source: authors’ computation based on 
European Environment Agency (2015) and Eurostat (2015). 
 
Figure 2 displays a regression tree, where the EFT payments have been clustered. At each 
node it splits the data further into subgroups and the final nodes or leaves display the average 
payment in that particular group. The left branches correspond with a true condition. The tree 
starts with a split on the Atlantic bio-geographical region, at greater or equal to 40 per cent of 
the NUTS 2 regions within that region. Together with the second node for the Atlantic regions 
at greater or equal to 99 this reads: if a NUTS 2 region is ~100 per cent in the Atlantic region, 
it would on average receive 1,434,000 € out of a 1 billion EU-EFT fund. If it has between 40 
and 99 per cent of its area in the Atlantic region, it will receive on average 2,846 €. The third 
node split at smaller to 3 per cent in the Alpine region and continues with splits for the 
Meditarranean region, tourist overnight stays, umemployment rates and GDP per capita. For 
the non-alpine, mediterranean regions, the regions with high unemployment on average 
receive less EFT payments than the one with lower unemployment. The touristically attractive 
Alpine regions receive on average high payments but less than the less touristically developed 
ones. The highest payment receive Alpine regions that have a GDP per capita less than 
18,000€. On average this is to say that remote mountainous and economically poor regions 
would receive the highest EFT payments – which would qualify the proposed EFT 
mechanism to be in line with the cohesion policy of the ERDF. 
5 Discussion – criteria for evaluating outcomes of the proposed scheme 
When evaluating the effect of integration of ecological indicators into the allocative rules of 
EU funds, an environmental policy analysis from a public finance perspective may consider 
three aspects: ecological effectiveness, the distribution of income, and the efficiency in 
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resource allocation. We elaborate on each in order to discuss both limits and merits of our 
proposal. 
5.1 Ecological effectiveness 
The ecological effectiveness of the EU-EFT could be measured as its contribution to reaching 
EU biodiversity and conservation goals. In such terms the result of our proposed EFT 
mechanism would strongly depend on both i) the robustness of the ecological indicators and 
ii) the governance structures in place. We propose that the EU-EFT scheme is composed of a 
quantitative indicator measured by N2k coverage of the NUTS2 regions and a qualitative 
indicator measuring the proportion of habitats reported according to the EU Nature Directives 
that were assessed with a favourable conservation status. Assuming that the resulting financial 
flows would actually set an incentive for the regions to enhance N2k sites and / or 
conservation management such that both or one of these indicators rise, one could expect a 
significant contribution to the EU conservation goals. Such assertion, however, depends on 
two factors that limit the certainty of predicting outcomes: the importance of the chosen 
indicators for reaching the EU conservation goals and the ability of the regions to provide the 
required actions.  
 In terms of the first, the N2k sites themselves contribute to reaching multiple goals set 
in the EU biodiversity strategy. In target 1, action 1, it is mentioned that the N2k network is to 
be completed and that further species and habitats are to be integrated within and beyond N2k 
networks (European Commission, 2011). The mid-term review states that the “Natura 2000 
network has been largely completed for terrestrial and inland water habitats, covering about 
18 % of the land surface”11 (European Commission, 2015). Thus there seems some but no 
great political demand for more N2k sites. But the mid-term review also states that the goal of 
securing and improving a defined percentage of species’, birds’ and habitats’ conservation 
status shows an insufficient rate of progress and that increased efforts are required. Assuming 
that N2k sites have to be appropriately established and managed to help to secure good 
conservation status of threatened species and habitats, the proposed EFT mechanism might 
help to reach such a conservation goal, especially since our EU-EFT proposal consists in a 
qualitative part which addresses the proportion of favourable conservation status directly. In 
this sense, it is crucial to ensure appropriate monitoring of species and habitats so that a 
reported improvement in conservation status is not just an improvement on paper.  
 Secondly, a fiscal incentive will only lead to an effect if the targeted jurisdictions have 
competencies that can correspond to the incentive (see section 2.2). While we have reviewed 
Member States’ responses about management responsibilities (European Commission, 2014, 
Annex II) and found that a majority of respondents has indicated at least a partial 
responsibility of decentral public authorities at NUTS 2 level (see section 2.3), this is not 
necessarily representative. We are furthermore only relatively certain that in most Member 
States national authorities such as ministries or at least NUTS 1 regions are mainly 
responsible for the planning and designation of N2k sites. Thus our assumption that through 
the implementation of an EU-EFT mechanism incentives for both the designation and the 
                                                 
11 The mid-term review of the EU biodiversity strategy also states that “The marine network coverage has 
increased to 6 %, still well below the 10 % global target” (European Commission, 2015) which might require an 
inclusion of marine N2k sites into the proposed EFT mechanism which has so far not be possible due to data 
limitations. 
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management quality of N2k sites are set, hinges on the different government and governance 
structure of the Member States. Since there is an institutional learning and N2k decisions are 
increasingly organised in a participatory fashion (Ferranti et al., 2013), we would expect that 
on average decentral authorities have at least some say in the respective planning and/or 
management procedures. For a more certain response, a comparative study of the exact 
decision making competencies and planning procedures for N2k sites and management 
remains a future research question. 
5.2 Distributive effects  
In the case of the EU-EFT model that we proposed (section 3) the transfers would be 
allocated according to the share of N2k area on the jurisdictions territory and the proportion of 
reported habitats in favourable conservation status. According to our assessment of the spatial 
distribution of resulting EFT payments (section 4), the highest sums would flow to 
mountainous and economically weak regions – which are very likely disadvantaged ones. The 
lowest payments would on average flow to the Atlantic region – which is an economically 
strong region in Europe that neither supplies great proportions of its area as N2k sites nor has 
it a high ratio of favourable statuses and reported habitats (see Fig.1). If an existing fund, such 
as the ERDF or LIFE, is allocated differently through an EFT mechanism, there would likely 
be losers against status quo who are not eligible for reception of that part of the funds any 
longer. The beneficiaries, mainly remote mountainous and economically less developed 
NUTS 2 regions (see section 4.3), however, would be well aligned with the cohesion policy 
goal of the ERDF, which we identified as the most suitable EU fund. If, on the other hand, the 
EFT fund would be an extra part of an existing fund, but generated from a growth in EU 
revenue, there might be no losers against status quo but only winners, since everyone would 
get at least some payments.  
But there remains an important element in the distributional effects of our EU-EFT 
proposal with respect to the chosen ecological indicators. It is a performance-based proposal, 
which means those that underperform would receive low payments. But those who 
underperform in conservation efforts might be the ones who need additional conservation 
funds the most – a problem which cannot be solved by the proposed design but only by 
specific purpose funds tailored to regions which lack implementation the most. Regarding 
conservation efforts, early action will be rewarded under the suggested EFT scheme. Those 
regions who already have made (or had a mandate to make) great conservation efforts in 
terms of the N2k coverage and / or ecological quality would receive high payments.  
Thus, in a nutshell, the proposed EFT mechanism benefits those who perform well in 
terms of EU nature conservation measures such as the coverage of N2k sites and favourable 
conservation status of habitats according to the Habitats and Bird Directives – which are 
mainly rather remote, economically and touristically less developed and mountainous regions. 
Therefore, the proposed EU-EFT scheme within the ERDF mechanism would be in 
accordance with EU cohesion policy. 
5.3 Cost-efficiency 
Considering optimality in terms of cost-efficiency or least-cost provision, it matters which 
EU-conservation goals are set, e.g. within the EU biodiversity strategy, and at what cost they 
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can be reached. In this context there is one particularly important differentiation between 
refinancing fiscal needs for conservation and stimulating performance.  
Regarding a closing of an N2k financing gap, it is therefore important to consider, that 
due to the performance based transfer design without specific spending conditions EFT 
mechanisms cannot function as an instrument to refinance conservation needs directly. The 
received revenues can but do not have to be spent on conservation. For closing a general 
financing gap (Kettunen et al., 2016, 2011; Milieu et al., 2016; N2k Group, 2016) dedicated 
specific purpose funds are needed that (co-)finance specific conservation tasks that implement 
the conservation baseline as defined by the EU and national legislation (see section 2.1 and 
2.2). For such purpose the better option from a public finance perspective would be to 
increase specific purpose funds, such as LIFE, which provides project action grants. Our EU-
EFT proposal may thus not fully serve to ensure an effective implementation of the N2k 
Directives. 
However, our performance-based approach has the benefit of cost-efficiently 
incentivising a greater willingness for conservation efforts and introducing a benchmarking or 
yardstick competition regarding conservation performance in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. Our cost-efficiency argument is thus the following: Considering the functioning of EFT 
from a perspective of rational decision making (which might not resemble the complete 
picture), especially those jurisdictions likely react to the incentive that have opportunity and / 
or (EU co-financed) implementation costs lower or equal to the (non-)financial benefits of 
enhancing their N2k area or quality. Given a policy goal, say target 1 of the EU biodiversity 
strategy to fully implement the Nature Directives, the goal could be reached at lowest costs. 
By supplying N2k sites of a high quality, jurisdiction can actually obtain revenue which is 
unspecified – which makes it an interesting option – i.e. those jurisdiction react first where the 
N2k can be supplied cheaper (including the existing LIFE or other co-financing measures) 
than what can be obtain via EU-EFT. In this sense, a EFT-EU scheme can be considered a 
cost-efficient approach to reach the politically set conservation targets, similar to a standard 
price approach (Baumol and Oates, 1971). Beyond this benefit of the incentive structure that 
induces cost-efficient provision our approach induces a benchmarking or yardstick 
competition: because there is only a limited EU-EFT fund available but N2k sites may 
increase among several regions, the mechanism introduces a dynamic competitive 
environment for increasing N2k performance over time. 
6 Conclusion – considering the political economy of conservation 
In order to support further biodiversity conservation efforts in the EU, we have proposed a 
design option of a European EFT mechanism to set incentives for nature conservation efforts 
of EU regions. We have synthesised current experiences with both EFT schemes and N2k 
financing mechanisms and, building on that knowledge and evidence, developed a possible 
EFT design for EU level. Such EFT-EU could enhance the current ERDF allocation 
mechanism through performance-oriented payments based on both quantitative and 
qualitative N2k indicators without specified conditions on spending the received transfers. To 
assess potential effects we have simulated the resulting financial flows and analysed the 
spatial distribution among socio-economic and bio-geographical characteristics of receiving 
regions.  
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The main innovative feature of the proposed EU-EFT scheme would be that, while the 
current EU funding instruments supporting biodiversity conservation, such as LIFE, focus on 
financing pre-determined objectives and measures, the inclusion of a EU-EFT scheme into the 
mix of financing instruments would grant performance based transfers without spending 
conditions to regions that supply most (or best managed) N2k sites. This allows for a greater 
freedom and autonomy of the receiving public authorities and creates an incentive for a cost-
efficient increase in quantity and/ or quality of N2k sites. EU-EFT allocations could be spent 
how recipients choose, would mainly benefit remote and poor mountainous regions and would 
thus be in line with the cohesion goal of the ERDF. As such it would represent a valuable 
complement to current programmes by setting economic incentives for the realisation of EU-
wide interest while allowing for the realisation of decentral preferences through payments 
without spending conditions via establishing performance-based ecological indicators for the 
funds’ distribution. Thereby we provide the first design proposal of an EFT scheme for an 
adaptation beyond the national context. We have provided evidence to support the analysis 
and assess potential outcomes of the developed scheme but acknowledge that we only provide 
predictions. 
In this respect, the effective functioning of the proposed mechanisms’ incentive depends 
on actual competencies and decision making power of regional authorities regarding the N2k 
implementation. Thus, the political economy of conservation in Europe matters substantially 
for the outcome of implementing an EU-EFT scheme. Considering the political economy of 
multi-level biodiversity governance, earmarking is politically not always easily acceptable. 
An EU-EFT scheme building on general-purpose transfers – while not the most effective in 
terms of bridging the N2k funding gap12 – has the potential benefit of being more politically 
acceptable. For example if both quantitative and qualitative N2k indicators are assessed based 
on regional performance, it thus introduces a yardstick competition from which mainly remote 
mountainous and economically less developed regions would benefit. This way the EU EFT 
scheme can be seen as a step towards the right direction and playing the long game by aiming 
to subtly change attitude towards conservation. Within the EU context future research 
directions may include a comparative study of the exact decision making competencies and 
planning procedures for N2k sites and management or an analysis of a corresponding 
implementation of an EU-EFT mechanism. Beyond the EU context an adaptation to other 
multilevel contexts such as federalist states or inter- / supranational bodies may pose 
interesting research questions. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Ecological fiscal transfer payments (EFT) in 1,000 € 266 3,759.4 2,508.4 2.6 13,364.3 
area in square km (area) 266 16,280.1 21,936.1 13.4 226,785.4 
population density (pop) 266 480.5 1,251.3 3.4 10,438.2 
GDP per capita (GDPcap) 266 25,802.9 10,443.8 8,000.0 86,400.0 
tourist overnight stays (tour) 266 9,764,382.0 11,438,209.0 126,378.0 77,692,454.0 
unemployment rate (unemp) 266 10.5 6.7 2.5 36.2 
Alpine region (ALP) 266 7.0 19.8 0 100 
Atlantic region 266 32.5 45.2 0 100 
Black Sea region (BLK) 266 0.2 2.0 0 22 
Boreal region (BOR) 266 5.3 21.8 0 100 
Continental region (CON) 266 33.3 42.9 0 100 
Mediterranean region (MED) 266 17.6 36.9 0 100 
Pannonian region (PAN) 266 3.5 17.0 0 100 
Steppic region (STE) 266 0.4 4.7 0 71 
Source: authors’ computation based on European Environment Agency (2015) and Eurostat (2015), monetary 
values are in purchasing power standards (PPS) per inhabitant, except for EFT payments which are based on an 
arbitrary fund size and rather stand for distributive patterns. 
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Socio economic control variables: 
 
Figure 3: Spatial distribution of covariates for 2013 (log of population density, log of GDP per capita, tourist 
stays and unemployment rates; from top left to bottom right). Source: authors’ computation based on Eurostat 
(2015). 
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Bio-geographical regions in Europe: 
 
Figure 4: Bio-geographical regions in EU-27 countries (Alpine (ALP), Atlantic (ATL), Black Sea (BLK), 
Boreal (BOR), Continental (CON), Mediterranean (MED), Pannonian (PAN), and Steppic (STE) regions). 
Source: authors computation based on European Environment Agency (2015) 
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Histogram of simulated EFT payments 
 
Figure 5: The frequency distribution plot of simulated EFT payments in 1,000 €, with mean at dashed line. 
Source: authors computation based on European Environment Agency (2015). 
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Variable Importance Plot from 10,000 regression trees: 
 
Figure 6: The variable importance of a Random Forest Model with 10,000 trees and a tenfold cross-validation. 
The x axis display the average increase in node purity by splitting a the variables at the y axis; source: authors 
computation based on European Environment Agency (2015) and Eurostat (2015). Variables are Atlantic (ATL), 
Alpine (ALP), Black Sea (BLK), Boreal (BOR), Continental (CON), Mediterranean (MED), Pannonian (PAN), 
and Steppic (STE) regions). Source: authors computation based on European Environment Agency (2015) and 
Eurostat (2015). 
 
 
